Uncertainty and the influence of group norms in the attitude–behaviour relationship by Smith, Joanne R. et al.
Running Head: UNCERTAINTY AND INFLUENCE
Uncertainty and the Influence of Group Norms in the Attitude-Behaviour Relationship
Joanne R. Smith
University of Queensland
Michael A. Hogg
Claremont Graduate University
Robin Martin
Aston University
Deborah J. Terry
University of Queensland
Joanne Smith
School of Psychology
University of Queensland
Brisbane, QLD 4072, Australia
Telephone: +61 (7) 3365-7295
Facsimile: +61 (7) 3365-4466
Email: j.smith@psy.uq.edu.au 
                                                                                                  September 25, 2006
Smith, J. R., Hogg, M. A., Martin R., & Terry, D. J. (2007). Uncertainty and the 
influence of group norms in the attitude-behaviour relationship. British 
Journal of Social Psychology, 46, 769-792.
Uncertainty and influence
Author Notes
The research reported in this article was funded by a grant to Michael Hogg, Deborah 
Terry, and Robin Martin from the Australian Research Council.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Joanne Smith, 
School of Psychology, University of Queensland, Brisbane, QLD 4072, Australia. 
Electronic mail may be sent by Internet to: j.smith@psy.uq.edu.au.
2
Uncertainty and influence
                                                             Abstract
Two studies were conducted to examine the impact of subjective uncertainty on 
conformity to group norms in the attitude-behaviour context. In both studies, subjective 
uncertainty was manipulated using a deliberative mindset manipulation (McGregor, 
Zanna, Holmes, & Spencer, 2001). In Study 1 (N = 106), participants were exposed to 
either an attitude-congruent or attitude-incongruent ingroup norm.  In Study 2 (N = 83), 
participants were exposed to either a congruent, incongruent, or ambiguous ingroup norm. 
A range of attitude-behaviour outcomes, including attitude-intention consistency and 
change in attitude certainty, were assessed. In both studies, levels of group-normative 
behaviour varied as a function of uncertainty condition. In Study 1, conformity to group 
norms, as evidenced by variations in level of attitude-intention consistency, was observed 
only in the high uncertainty condition. In Study 2, exposure to an ambiguous norm had 
different effects for those in the low and high uncertainty conditions. In the low 
uncertainty condition, greatest conformity was observed in the attitude-congruent norm 
condition compared to an attitude-congruent or ambiguous norm. In contrast, individuals 
in the high uncertainty condition displayed greatest conformity when exposed to either an 
attitude-congruent or ambiguous ingroup norm. The implications of these results for the 
role of subjective uncertainty in social influence processes are discussed.   
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Uncertainty and influence
Although people generally welcome pleasant little surprises, most of us find it 
uncomfortable to feel uncertain about more significant aspects of our lives, such as who 
we are and how we relate to and interact with other people. Uncertainty can be 
threatening and people generally feel a need to eliminate it or to find ways to make it 
tolerable and cognitively manageable. Uncertainty about our attitudes, beliefs, feelings, 
and perceptions, as well as about our selves and our relationship to other people, is 
aversive, because uncertainty undermines our confidence in how to behave and what to 
expect from our physical and social environment. We have a fundamental need to reduce 
feelings of uncertainty about our world and our place within it. Thus, uncertainty often 
motivates behaviour aimed at reducing uncertainty. The present research reports the 
results of two studies designed to test the impact of uncertainty on social influence 
processes, namely conformity to ingroup norms in the context of the relationship between 
attitudes and action.
The importance of uncertainty as a motive for behaviour is not a novel idea in 
social psychology. For example, Festinger’s (1954a, 1954b) social comparison theory 
rests on the assumption that there is a “motivation to know that one’s opinions are correct 
and to know precisely what one is and is not capable of doing” (1954b, p. 217). Similarly, 
Schachter (1959) argued that uncertainty about what one is feeling and how one should 
react motivates affiliation to obtain comparative information from others. The greater a 
person’s uncertainty about the situation they are in, what they are feeling, and the correct 
way to behave, the stronger the tendency to affiliate with similar others for social 
comparison purposes.
The role of uncertainty in social influence processes was highlighted early on by 
Sherif (1936). His autokinetic experiments showed that perceptual uncertainty produced 
convergence on a group norm. Furthermore, this convergence was associated with 
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reduced feelings of insecurity (Sherif & Harvey, 1952). Group processes are central to the 
resolution of uncertainty in the autokinetic paradigm, such that when people feel 
uncertain they become increasingly dependent upon their group for feelings of relative 
certainty. The idea that stimulus ambiguity produces uncertainty leading to influence was 
also confirmed by Asch (1956) who found an inverse relationship between task clarity 
(i.e., degree of similarity in line length) and conformity to others’ judgements. By and 
large, the evidence suggests that task and stimulus ambiguity produces uncertainty, and 
this uncertainty leads to increased susceptibility to influence.
Uncertainty as a motive underlying social influence came to the fore in Deutsch 
and Gerard’s (1955) distinction between processes of normative and informational 
influence. Normative influence arises from a desire to conform to the positive 
expectations of others—people are dependent on others for positive regard, and comply 
with them to be liked. In contrast, informational influence arises from a desire to resolve 
feelings of uncertainty, form an accurate view of reality, and to act correctly. 
Informational influence is ‘true influence’, resulting in private acceptance and 
internalisation that disambiguates reality, whereas normative influence is surface 
behavioural compliance and is traditionally considered the type of social influence most 
often associated with groups. Thus, true influence is an informational process activated by 
uncertainty about the correctness of one’s judgements.
There are limitations, however, to a characterisation of conformity as either 
dependence based on a need for social approval (i.e., normative influence) or as 
dependence based on a need for information (i.e., informational influence). According to 
self-categorisation theory (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987), intragroup 
consensus, agreement, and uniformity are generated by a distinct form of social influence 
called referent informational influence (e.g., Hogg & Turner, 1987). The social 
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categorisation of others as categorically similar to self (i.e., members of the same group 
for social comparison purposes) produces shared expectations of agreement. 
Disconfirmation of these expectations creates uncertainty and openness to influence 
(Abrams & Hogg, 1990; Turner & Oakes, 1989). Self-categorisation theory views 
subjective validity and uncertainty as a function of “agreement and disagreement about 
the same stimulus in the context of a shared social reality” (Turner, 1991, p.162). What is 
perceived as evidence about reality, as having informational value, is a function of shared 
ingroup norms. Such norms are subjectively prescriptive in that they make one feel that 
one ought to see, think, or act in a certain way, and they provide information that 
particular responses are objectively valid and appropriate. Disagreement within the 
confines of common category membership arouses uncertainty that is reduced by 
adherence, or conformity, to the perceived group norm.
The central idea of the self-categorisation analysis of social influence is that 
agreement with ‘categorically identical others’ (i.e., members of the same group as 
oneself) in a given situation creates subjective validity. However, there have been 
surprisingly few tests of the implied hypothesis that disagreement with similar others 
should motivate social influence and conformity. In an early demonstration of referent 
informational influence, Abrams, Wetherell, Cochrane, Hogg, and Turner (1990) 
conducted three experiments examining the efect of disagreement with similar and 
dissimilar others on responses in the autokinetic paradigm (Sherif, 1936), the Asch (1956) 
paradigm, and the group polarisation paradigm (e.g., Moscovici & Zavalloni, 1969). 
Across the three paradigms, self-categorisation was found to be a critical determining 
factor in social influence—only disagreement with members of one’s group was 
associated with judgemental conformity. Relatedly, McGarty, Turner, Oakes, and Haslam 
(1993) used a perceptual task where there was an objectively correct answer but where it 
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was difficult for participants to be certain of that answer and found that disagreement 
increased uncertainty, while agreement increased certainty. 
It is important to note that tests of the role of uncertainty in social influence have 
focused on the uncertainty caused either by stimulus ambiguity (Asch, 1956; Sherif, 
1936) or by disagreement on judgemental tasks (Abrams et al., 1990; McGarty et al., 
1993). Indeed, McGarty et al. are explicit in making a distinction between judgemental 
confidence and more general feelings of confidence in one’s abilities, focusing only on 
the first form of uncertainty. Thus, the analysis of uncertainty in social identity contexts 
has focused on its role in producing conformity out of disagreement over attitudinal and 
perceptual judgements. It has not focused explicitly on feelings of uncertainty about self, 
identity, and the world in general. 
Subjective Uncertainty
The more general motivational role of uncertainty in group processes, intergroup 
relations, and social identity contexts has been elaborated recently by uncertainty 
reduction theory (Hogg, 2000, 2004, 2005). Here, the emphasis is on feelings of 
uncertainty, particularly related to or focused directly on self. Furthermore, uncertainty is 
not viewed as an individual personality trait (cf. De Cremer & Sedikides, 2005; 
Sorrentino & Roney, 1999), but as a product of the immediate situation or wider social 
context—social contextual factors influence uncertainty, the resolution of uncertainty, and 
the way in which such resolution is expressed. Uncertainty reduction theory differs from 
previous conceptualisations of the role of uncertainty in social identity processes in that 
uncertainty is not caused only by disagreement with similar others, but can reflect 
economic uncertainty, national uncertainty, uncertainty about one’s relationships with 
others, uncertainty about one’s self and one’s social world, and so forth. 
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Generally, people strive to reduce feelings of uncertainty about themselves, their 
social world, and their place within it—people like to know who they are and how to 
behave, and who others are and how they might behave. Thus, feeling uncertain, even if 
that uncertainty is not related to proximal perceptions, may leave one open to influence on 
one’s attitudes and behaviours quite unrelated to the source of one’s uncertainty. 
Subjective uncertainty itself may create a predisposition to be influenced, and one way to 
reduce generalised feelings of uncertainty may be to conform to group norms that define 
one’s attitudes and behaviours. Instead of having to forge coherence and derive self-worth 
from personal idiosyncrasies, one can adopt the norms of the group and use them as 
internalised guides for behaviour. Indeed, conformity to ingroup norms reduces 
uncertainty by increasing consensus (e.g., Turner, 1985) and by clarifying self-definition 
in terms of social identity. The aim of the present research was to test whether general 
subjective uncertainty could influence how strongly people conform to ingroup norms, in 
the context of the relationship between people’s attitudes and their behaviour.
Uncertainty has been found to influence a wide range of social phenomena. 
McGregor, Zanna, Holmes, and Spencer (2001) found that personal uncertainty, defined 
as “an acute kind of identity crisis that can arise from awareness of having inconsistent or 
unclear self-relevant cognitions” (p. 473) was associated with more extreme conviction 
about social issues (i.e., attitude hardening) and increased intergroup bias (see also Grieve 
& Hogg, 1999). Moreover, conviction about social issues may operate to decrease the 
subjective salience of personal uncertainties (McGregor & Marigold, 2003, Study 4). Van 
den Bos and colleagues (e.g., van den Bos, 2001; van den Bos & Miedema, 2000) have 
shown that uncertainty affects people’s affective reactions to issues of perceived fairness 
and procedural justice. Indeed, salience of one’s uncertainties may have a stronger impact 
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on attitudes and behaviours than other forms of uncertainty such as mortality salience 
(van den Bos, Poortvliet, Maas, Miedema, & van den Ham, 2005).
The Attitude-Behaviour Relationship
 Norms are a component of two of the major theories of the relationship between 
people’s attitudes and their behaviour (i.e., the theory of reasoned action—Fishbein & 
Ajzen, 1975; the theory of planned behaviour—Ajzen, 1991). However, there is little 
evidence that norms play a significant role in the attitude-behaviour relationship (see 
Armitage & Conner, 2001, for a review). The lack of evidence for the influence of norms 
has prompted Ajzen (1991) to conclude that personal factors are the primary determinants 
of behaviour. In recent years, however, researchers have argued that this lack of evidence 
may be due to the fact that norms have been conceptualised as external pressures on 
people—pressures reflecting specific others’ expectations and existing “out there” instead 
of within the person’s own psyche. An alternative conceptualisation of norms in the 
attitude-behaviour relationship, based on the social identity approach, has been proposed 
by Terry and Hogg (1996).
According to the social identity approach, when people view themselves as 
belonging to a group and feel that being a group member is important to them, they will 
align their behaviour with the norms and standards of the group. Thus, people are 
influenced by norms because norms prescribe the context-specific attitudes and 
behaviours appropriate for group members. Applying this reasoning to the question of 
why norms do not appear to influence the attitude-behaviour relationship, Terry and Hogg 
(1996) have argued that norms will influence the attitude-behaviour relationship provided 
that the norm is tied to a specific and relevant group that is a subjectively salient or 
important basis for self-definition. The social identity approach to attitude-behaviour 
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relations has received support from a series of both field and laboratory research (see 
Terry, Hogg, & White, 2000, for a review).  
    To address the role of norms in the attitude-behaviour context, Terry, Hogg, and 
colleagues have developed an experimental paradigm, somewhat unique to the attitude-
behaviour field (Smith & Terry, 2003; Terry, Hogg, & McKimmie, 2000; Wellen, Hogg, 
& Terry, 1998; White, Hogg, & Terry, 2002). In the basic paradigm, attitudes are 
measured first, then the level of normative support from a self-relevant ingroup is 
manipulated, and finally participants’ willingness to engage in attitude-related behaviours, 
and actual behaviour, is assessed. Across a range of attitudinal dimensions and with a 
range of group memberships, this research has demonstrated that normative support from 
an ingroup increases willingness (or intentions) to engage in attitude-consistent behaviour, 
while opposition to one’s initial attitude from one’s ingroup is associated with a 
weakening of the relationship between attitudes, intentions, and actions. Within the 
attitude-behaviour context, intentions have been found to be the most important predictor 
of actual behaviour (see Sheeran, 2002, for a review). In the present research, intention to 
engage in attitude-consistent behaviour was the critical outcome measure. Our aim in the 
present research was to test whether subjective uncertainty would affect social influence 
processes as reflected in conformity to ingroup norms in the attitude-behaviour context. In 
doing so, the present research advances extant knowledge by contributing to what Zanna 
and Fazio (1982) have termed the “third generation” of attitude-behaviour research. 
Specifically, our general hypothesis that the experience of uncertainty may motivate 
conformity to ingroup norms, thereby influencing the degree and direction of attitude-
behaviour consistency, contributes to a greater understanding of both when and how 
attitudes are translated into action.
The Present Research
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We conducted two experiments using the attitude-behaviour paradigm developed 
by Terry, Hogg, and colleagues. In both studies, uncertainty and level of normative 
support for participants’ attitudes were manipulated, and participants’ willingness to 
conform to group norms with respect to attitude-related behaviours was assessed. The 
experimental attitude-behaviour paradigm has some important advantages. It uses real 
attitudes related to “real-world” social issues rather than abstract perceptions and 
judgements (cf. Abrams et al., 1990; McGarty et al., 1993), and it allows a very clear 
discontinuity between the source of uncertainty, self, and the focus of subsequent 
uncertainty-reducing normative conduct. As a result, the present research represents a 
more conservative test of the impact of uncertainty on social influence processes. Indeed, 
evidence that more abstract, subjective, or self-relevant uncertainty has an effect on 
conformity to ingroup norms in relation to a specific and concrete attitude issue would 
demonstrate more powerfully the impact that uncertainty issues play in social influence 
phenomena.
We had two simple predictions. First, we expected greater attitude-intention 
consistency when participants were exposed to a group norm that was congruent with 
their own attitude (an attitude-congruent norm) compared to when participants were 
exposed to an attitude-incongruent norm. Second, level of uncertainty should moderate 
the effect of normative support—that is, we expected greater conformity to ingroup norms 
under high levels of uncertainty.
STUDY 1
Method
Participants and Design
Participants were 23 male and 83 female (N = 106, mean age = 20.96 years) 
introductory psychology students at a large Australian university, who received partial 
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course credit for participation. They were assigned randomly to conditions in a 2 
(uncertainty: low vs. high) x 2 (ingroup norm: attitude-incongruent vs. attitude-congruent) 
between-subjects factorial design.
Procedure
Participants were led to believe that they would be completing a series of 
unrelated tasks on the topics of beliefs, opinions, and decision-making. To maintain the 
cover story, the different tasks were printed using a variety of fonts and different coloured 
paper. Participants were tested in groups of two to ten people. A male or female 
experimenter conducted the sessions.
Pre-experimental measures. For the first part of the study, participants completed 
a questionnaire that, in addition to collecting demographic information, assessed 
participants’ attitudes to the focal issue—the introduction of “voluntary student unionism” 
(VSU) 1. Attitude was assessed via two items: (a) a simple measure requiring participants 
to indicate whether they supported or opposed VSU (1 oppose, 2 support), and (b) a scale 
measuring degree of support for VSU (1 strongly oppose, 7 strongly support). The key 
attitude items were embedded among a number of filler attitude issues.
Uncertainty manipulation. Next, participants completed a “dilemma and decision-
making task” designed to manipulate self-relevant uncertainty. In the high uncertainty 
condition, participants were asked to think of an unresolved personal dilemma. They were 
asked to select a dilemma that made them feel very uncertain, that they had not resolved, 
and that took the form of “should I…..or not?”. After writing a short description of the 
dilemma, participants wrote down the primary personal value associated with the 
dilemma. A series of open-ended questions prompted deliberation about the relative pros 
and cons of the two options outlined in the dilemma. Thus, the questions confronted 
participants directly with inconsistencies and uncertainties among self-elements such as 
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goals, values, and possible selves. As such, it is a direct manipulation of the salience of 
self-relevant uncertainty. This uncertainty manipulation was developed and tested by 
McGregor et al. (2001; see McGregor, 2003, 2004, for a review of the empirical support 
for this manipulation).
Participants in the low uncertainty condition completed similar materials, except 
that they deliberated about a dilemma a friend was having, about which they thought they 
knew what the friend should do. This control procedure was designed to ensure that the 
complexity of the process of completing the materials was equivalent between conditions 
and that only the salience of the self-relevant uncertainty varied. In past research, this 
uncertainty manipulation increased feelings of uncertainty, but had no significant effect 
on self-esteem or affect (McGregor et al., 2001, Study 1).2 
After completing the uncertainty task participants answered five questions, 
adapted from Campbell et al.’s (1996) Self Concept Clarity Scale, to check on the 
manipulation of uncertainty. The questions were: “My beliefs about myself conflict with 
one another”, “I wonder about what kind of person I really am”, “The different aspects of 
my personality are in conflict”, “I know other people better than I know myself”, and “I 
have a clear sense of the kind of person that I am” (1 very slightly or not at all, 5 
extremely, one item was reverse scored). The five items formed a reliable self-conceptual 
uncertainty scale with higher scores indicating greater uncertainty (α = .77).
Participants also completed four items adapted from Rosenberg’s (1965) self-
esteem scale. Participants were asked to indicate the extent to which they agreed with four 
statements (“I feel that I have a number of good qualities”, “I am able to do things as well 
as other people”, I feel I do not have much to be proud of”, “I take a positive attitude 
towards myself”; 1 not at all, 9 very much). These items were included to ensure that the 
uncertainty manipulation targeted level of uncertainty, but did not depress self-esteem. 
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One item was reverse scored. The four items were combined to create a self-esteem scale 
(α = .77), with high scores indicating higher self-esteem. Finally, participants were asked 
to rate their current mood on three 9-point semantic differential scales (unpleasant-
pleasant, bad-good, unhappy-happy). These items were combined to form a measure of 
current mood state (α = .82).3
Next, participants completed a 5-minute filler task in which they had to find a 
number of words within a larger puzzle. This delay was included because past research 
has found that threatened participants initially suppress awareness of a threat (i.e., high 
uncertainty), and that responses to uncertainty emerge only after the initial suppression 
phase has passed (Pyszczynski, Greenberg, & Solomon, 1999).
Normative support manipulation. After completing the filler task, normative 
support was manipulated via two sources of information (see Smith & Terry, 2003). First, 
participants studied a series of bargraphs, ostensibly the results of three recent studies of 
student opinion, showing the percentage of support and opposition to the target issue and 
two filler issues. For participants in the attitude-congruent norm condition, the bargraphs 
indicated that students at their university held the same attitude as them towards the target 
issue. In contrast, participants in the attitude-incongruent norm condition were exposed to 
bargraphs that indicated that their fellow students held the opposite attitude to them. In 
both conditions, the bargraphs indicated equal levels of support and opposition for the two 
filler issues. To ensure that participants processed the results, they then answered a 
number of questions about the results.
Participants also summarised a series of representative opinion statements that 
indicated that the group either strongly supported or strongly opposed the introduction of 
voluntary student unionism. Participants in the attitude-congruent norm condition read 
four statements that suggested that the group supported their position on the target issue 
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and one statement that opposed their position. The opposite pattern was provided for 
participants in the attitude-incongruent norm condition. After reading the statements, 
participants were asked to integrate and summarise the opinions presented.
Dependent measures. Next, participants completed a questionnaire that measured 
willingness to engage in attitude-consistent behaviour. They completed four items relating 
to how willing they would be to: (1) take a flier from a group that supported the 
introduction of VSU, (2) help distribute information leaflets from a group that supported 
the introduction of VSU, (3) attend a rally supporting the introduction of VSU, and (4) 
vote to support the introduction of VSU if there was a university referendum on the issue 
(1 not at all willing, 9 extremely willing).  Each willingness item was recoded to reflect 
the strength of attitude-intention consistency ranging from 1 (low consistency) to 9 (high 
consistency), depending on whether participants supported or opposed the introduction of 
voluntary student unionism at the outset of the study. That is, if participants opposed the 
introduction of VSU, responses were reverse-scored.  However, if participants supported 
the introduction of VSU, responses were not reversed. The re-scored willingness items 
were combined to form an index of willingness to engage in attitude-consistent behaviour, 
such that high scores reflected high levels consistency (α = .85).4
In addition, participants completed three items assessing willingness to work on 
behalf of the group. They were asked to indicate how willing they would be to: (1) be a 
student guide during orientation next year, (2) read and evaluate materials on university 
student activities, and (3) evaluate and provide feedback on the public transport options 
available to students (1 not at all willing, 9 extremely willing). Responses were combined 
to form a measure of willingness to work for the group (α = .72).
In order to see whether levels of uncertainty changed across the course of the 
study, participants then completed the five items used earlier in the study to assess self-
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concept clarity. Responses were combined to form a measure of post-test uncertainty (α = 
.78). In addition, participants completed an item assessing their comprehension of the 
normative information.  They were asked to indicate the extent to which students at their 
university supported or opposed the introduction of VSU (1 strongly supported, 9 
strongly opposed). At the end of the study, participants were fully debriefed.
Results
Manipulation Checks
Uncertainty manipulation check. To ensure that the dilemmas reported in the low 
and high uncertainty condition were similar in topic and tone, the types of dilemmas 
reported by participants were examined. Across the uncertainty conditions, 35% of 
participants deliberated about academic concerns (e.g., changing courses, career 
directions), 31% about romantic relationships (e.g., initiating or terminating a 
relationship), and 17% about other relationships (e.g., friendships). The remaining 18% 
deliberated about a variety of concerns (e.g., quitting smoking, purchasing a new car). 
The dilemmas in both conditions were similar in topic and tone.
A 2 (uncertainty: low, high) x 2 (normative support: low, high) ANOVA on the 
scale assessing self-concept clarity revealed a marginal main effect for the uncertainty 
manipulation only, F(1, 98) = 3.80, p = .054, η2 = .04. Participants reported higher levels 
of uncertainty in the high than low uncertainty condition (Ms = 2.68 and 2.36, 
respectively, on a 5-point scale). Despite the relatively small effect, we felt that the 
uncertainty manipulation was successful in inducing changes in certainty related to 
participants’ self-concept as opposed to felt uncertainty (see McGregor et al., 2001) or 
task uncertainty (see Grieve & Hogg, 1999).
There were no significant effects on the measure of self-esteem—the 
manipulation of uncertainty did not depress self-esteem. However, there was a significant 
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main effect for uncertainty on the mood measure, F(1, 98) = 4.42, p = .04, η2 = .04, such 
that individuals in the high uncertainty condition reported less positive mood (M = 5.67) 
than individuals in the low uncertainty condition (Ms = 5.67 and 6.32 respectively on a 9-
point scale).5
Normative support manipulation. A 2 (uncertainty: low, high) x 2 (normative 
information: oppose VSU, support VSU) ANOVA was conducted on participants’ 
comprehension of the normative information. There was a significant main effect for type 
of normative information only, F(1, 102) = 143.28, p < .001, η2 = .58.  Participants 
exposed to the “oppose VSU” information were more likely to report that the group 
opposed VSU than participants exposed to the “support VSU” information (Ms = 7.13 
and 2.88, respectively). Thus, participants interpreted the content of the normative 
information correctly.
Dependent Measures
Our key analysis was a 2 (uncertainty: low, high) x 2 (normative support: low, 
high) ANCOVA, with initial attitude as the covariate, on the measure of willingness to 
display attitude consistent behaviour and the measure of willingness to work for the 
group. These two dependent measures were not significantly correlated (r = -.06, p = .59). 
On willingness to display attitude-consistent behaviour, after controlling for initial 
attitude (F[1, 97] = 181.79, p < .001), there was a significant main effect for normative 
support, F(1, 97) = 7.90, p = .006, η2 = .03. Participants exposed to a norm that was 
congruent with their own attitude displayed greater attitude-intention consistency than 
participants exposed to an attitude-incongruent norm (Ms = 5.09 and 4.27, respectively).
This effect was qualified by a significant interaction with uncertainty, F(1, 97) = 
5.72, p = .019, η2 = .02 (see Figure 1). At high levels of uncertainty, participants who 
were exposed to an attitude-congruent norm were more willing to display attitude-
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consistent behaviour than participants exposed to an attitude-incongruent norm, simple 
F(1, 97) = 13.79, p < .001.  Furthermore, when exposed to an attitude-incongruent norm, 
high uncertainty participants displayed less attitude-intention consistency than low 
uncertainty participants (M = 3.78 vs. 4.77), F(1, 97) = 5.76, p = .018. No other simple 
effects were significant. 
On willingness to work for the group there was only a significant Uncertainty x 
Normative Support interaction, F(1, 93) = 5.66, p = .019, η2 = .06 (see Figure 2). 
Participants who were exposed to an attitude-congruent norm were more willing to work 
for the group when they were high than low in uncertainty, simple F(1, 93) = 7.67, p = 
.007. No other simple main effects were significant. 
In order to see whether level of uncertainty changed across the course of the study, 
a 2 (uncertainty) x 2 (normative support) x 2 (time) within-subjects ANCOVA (with initial 
attitude as the covariate) was performed on participants’ self-concept clarity scores. 
Analysis revealed a significant main effect for time, F(1, 93) = 5.70, p = .019, η2 = .06, 
such that level of uncertainty decreased over time (Ms = 2.52 and 2.21, respectively). This 
effect was qualified by a significant Uncertainty x Normative Support x Time interaction, 
F(1, 93) = 4.27, p = .041, η2 = .05 (see Figure 3). 
For ease of reporting this interaction, difference scores were calculated by 
subtracting post-test uncertainty scores from post-manipulation uncertainty scores, and 
follow up tests performed on these difference scores. One-sample t-tests were conducted 
to determine whether the changes in level of uncertainty differed significantly from zero. 
Analysis revealed a marginal effect for normative support among low uncertainty 
participants, F(1, 93) = 3.38, p = .069, but not among high uncertainty participants. That 
is, low uncertainty participants exposed to an attitude-congruent norm reported a 
significant decrease in uncertainty (M = .38, t[22] = 4.13, p < .001) compared to 
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participants exposed to an attitude-incongruent norm (M = .13, t[20] = 1.53, ns). For the 
high uncertainty participants, uncertainty decreased significantly across the course of the 
study, but this did not vary as a function of normative support (Mincongruent = .43, t[21] = 
4.16, p < .001 and Mcongruent = .31, t[31] = 3.91, p < .001.
Discussion
As predicted, ingroup normative support for participants’ attitude affected their 
willingness to display attitude-consistent behaviour. However, uncertainty moderated this 
relationship between group norms and group behaviour—both in terms of conformity to 
group norms and in terms of willingness to work for the group. When uncertain, the 
expression of attitude-consistent intentions depended on the direction of the group norm. 
Participants displayed more attitude-related consistency when provided with a supportive 
norm than a non-supportive norm. However, when they were relatively certain, they did 
not conform to the group norm. In addition, participants were more willing to work for 
the group on other issues when they were uncertain and provided with a congruent group 
norm. Finally, level of uncertainty decreased across the course of the study. For certain 
participants, exposure to a supportive group norm increased their certainty, but for 
uncertain participants, exposure to any group norm reduced uncertainty.
These findings add to what we already know about the role of judgemental 
uncertainty in social influence processes (e.g., Asch, 1956; Sherif, 1936), however they 
make an important contribution by showing that more abstract, generalised self-relevant 
uncertainty can also lead individuals to rely on group norms to direct their behaviour. 
Moreover, when uncertain, individuals did not merely conform to group norms on 
relatively unimportant, irrelevant, or transitory perceptual judgement dimensions, but 
altered their willingness to express behavioural intentions that were more or less 
consistent with important and self-relevant attitudes.
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There was also evidence that provision of a supportive group norm had different 
effects for low and high uncertain individuals on more generalised willingness to work for 
the group. When uncertain and when provided with evidence that one’s attitude was in 
line with one’s group, individuals were more willing to engage in group behaviour. It is 
possible that the provision of a supportive norm allowed uncertain individuals to feel a 
sense of belongingness to the group, leading to an increased willingness to expend effort 
on behalf of the group. Thus, feeling uncertain seems to prompt conformity to group 
norms, whether these are specific group norms (i.e., doing what your group thinks you 
should do) or more general group norms (i.e., working hard for your group). 
Finally, there were differences in the way in which level of uncertainty changed 
across the course of the study. For more certain participants, exposure to a supportive 
group norm increased self-concept certainty, whereas exposure to a non-supportive norm 
had no impact on certainty. That is, agreement with similar others was associated with 
greater certainty relative to disagreement with similar others. In contrast, all uncertain 
participants, irrespective of the type of norm, reported an increase in certainty over time. 
Indeed, mere exposure to a group norm reduced uncertainty. It might be that when 
uncertain, information about either the validity or invalidity of one’s beliefs, attitudes, 
feelings, and actions is able to contribute to a sense of certainty.   
STUDY 2
Study 1 provided good support for the idea that subjective uncertainty influences 
social influence processes, specifically conformity to group norms. Study 2 was designed 
to address potential limitations, and to extend and consolidate these findings. 
The key limitation of Study 1 was that the uncertainty manipulation check did not 
attain conventional levels of statistical significance (p = .054). However, we felt this was 
due to how it was measured. That is, previous research has used a measure of felt 
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uncertainty (i.e., endorsement of uncertainty-related adjectives) to test the effectiveness of 
the uncertainty manipulated (see McGregor et al., 2001), rather than the more stringent 
measure of self-concept uncertainty that we used. In Study 2 we checked on the 
manipulation more fully, by including a measure of felt uncertainty in the immediate 
context, as well as a measure of self-concept certainty.
In Study 2 we also assessed uncertainty more broadly, by measuring pre-test and 
post-test attitude certainty. Previous research has shown that disagreement with fellow 
group members, such as that implied in our attitude-incongruent norm condition, is 
associated with increased social influence (e.g., Abrams et al., 1990). Thus, we wanted to 
examine the effect of our manipulations on attitude certainty and to determine whether, 
over and above any social influence associated with changes in attitude certainty, self-
relevant uncertainty was associated with conformity to group norms.
Our final innovation in Study 2 was the inclusion of an ambiguous norm condition 
in which participants were exposed to information that suggested that the group was 
undecided on the issue and therefore had no clear norm. Our interest was in the way in 
which certain and uncertain participants would react to an ambiguous norm. Inclusion of 
an ambiguous norm allowed us to investigate further why our uncertain participants did 
not conform to the ingroup norm. It is possible that in the low uncertainty condition, 
because participants contemplated a friend’s dilemma (and potential “screw-up”), this 
may have primed them to believe that others are often wrong and allowed them to ignore 
the information about the attitudes of others when it conflicted with their own attitude 
position. The inclusion of an ambiguous norm, in which the group’s position is neither 
completely incompatible nor completely compatible with the individual’s attitude, may 
address this issue. If certain participants’ responses to an ambiguous norm are similar to 
their responses to an attitude-incongruent norm, this may suggest that certain participants 
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are not simply ignoring information that fails to support their initial attitude, but that level 
of (un)certainty influences responses to variations in normative support.
The question of how group members respond to an ambiguous norm is also linked 
to a program of research by Hogg and his colleagues on the interplay between uncertainty 
and entitativity (e.g., Hogg, Sherman, Dierselhuis, Maitner, & Moffitt, in press), which 
shows that uncertainty engenders a preference for membership in highly entitative groups. 
Entitative groups have a number of properties (e.g., clear structure, common fate, 
interdependence—see Hamilton & Sherman, 1996; Lickel et al., 2000), the most relevant 
here being that highly entitative groups have clear and consensual norms and prototypes. 
Thus, in the present context, would it be the case that uncertain participants dislike the 
ambiguous norm because it fails to provide clear directions for the appropriate way to 
think and behave? Or would uncertain participants latch on to the ambiguous norm 
because it does not contradict their position directly, allowing them to interpret the norm 
in line with their attitude?
In other respects Study 2 was identical to Study 1, except that we used a different 
attitude issue, banning smoking on campus, to ensure that the Study 1 results were not 
attitude-specific. As in Study 1, we expected greater attitude-intention consistency when 
participants were exposed to an attitude-congruent norm compared to when participants 
were exposed to an attitude-incongruent norm. Second, level of uncertainty should 
moderate the effect of normative support. That is, we expected greater conformity to 
ingroup norms under high levels of uncertainty. The effect of the ambiguous norm was 
not specified due to the exploratory nature of this aspect of the research. However, based 
on the arguments presented above, two contrasting hypotheses can be generated. That is, 
following exposure to an ambiguous norm, high uncertainty participants may display 
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greater willingness to engage in attitude-consistent behaviour or they may display reduced 
willingness to engage in attitude-consistent behaviour.
Method
Participants and Design
Participants were 23 male and 60 female (N = 83, mean age = 18.31 years) 
introductory psychology students who participated for partial course credit. They were 
assigned randomly to conditions in a 2 (uncertainty: low vs. high) x 2 (type of norm: 
attitude-incongruent, attitude-congruent, ambiguous) between-subjects factorial design. 
Participants were tested in groups of two to ten people by a female experimenter.
Procedure
The procedures and materials used in Study 2 were identical to those used in 
Study 1, with three key differences. First, attitude was measured with multiple items and 
there was also a measure of attitude certainty. Second, there was a third level to the norm 
variable—the ambiguous norm condition. Finally, we used a different attitude topic (i.e., 
banning smoking on campus).
Pre-experimental measures. Participants indicated their attitudes to the focal issue 
of banning smoking on campus. Attitude was assessed with six items: a binary measure (1 
oppose, 2 support) and five 9-point semantic differentials that assessed level of support 
for a ban (strongly disagree-strongly agree, bad-good, approve-disapprove, favourable-
unfavourable, dislike-like). The semantic differentials formed a reliable scale (α = .95). 
Attitude certainty was assessed with three items that measured participants’ confidence, 
certainty, and sureness of their opinion about banning smoking on campus (1 not at all, 9 
a great deal). Responses were combined to form a reliable scale (α = .95). The target 
items were embedded among a number of filler attitude issues.
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Uncertainty manipulation. Next, participants completed the “dilemma and 
decision-making task” from Study 1. After completing the uncertainty task, participants 
indicated their agreement (1 very slightly or not at all, 5 extremely) with three statements 
assessing self-concept clarity: “My beliefs about myself conflict with one another”, “I 
feel I am not really the person I appear to be”, and “The different parts of my personality 
are in conflict”. Responses were combined so that higher scores indicated greater 
uncertainty (α = .80). Participants also responded to five uncertainty-related adjective 
items (uneasy, unclear, conflicted, unsure of self or goals, indecisive) and were asked to 
indicate the extent to which the adjective applied to the way they were feeling right now 
(1 not at all, 5 extremely). These items formed a measure of felt uncertainty (α = .83).
Participants completed the four items adapted from Rosenberg’s (1965) self-
esteem scale and the three mood items (see Study 1). The self-esteem and mood items 
were combined to form two reliable scales (α = .76 and .88, respectively).6 Next, 
participants completed a 5-minute filler task (see Study 1).
Normative support manipulation. As in Study 1, level of normative support was 
manipulated by asking participants to study a series of bargraphs and opinion statements. 
In the attitude-congruent norm condition, the bargraphs indicated that, on the whole, 85% 
of students at the university held the same attitude as the participant towards the target 
issue, and participants were exposed to four supportive statements and one non-
supportive opinion statement. In the attitude-incongruent norm condition, the bargraphs 
indicated that, on the whole, 85% of their fellow students held the opposite attitude to 
them, and participants were exposed to four non-supportive statements and one 
supportive statement. In the ambiguous norm condition, participants were exposed to 
graphs and opinion statements that suggested that opinion was divided and undecided on 
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the target issue. Participants completed a number of comprehension tasks to ensure that 
they processed the normative information (see Study 1).
Dependent measures. Next, participants indicated their willingness to engage in 
attitude-consistent behaviour. They completed five items concerning how willing they 
would be to engage in different behaviours related to support for a smoking ban on 
campus: (1) taking a flier, (2) distributing information leaflets, (3) attending a rally, (4) 
voting, and (5) signing a petition (1 not at all willing, 9 extremely willing). Each item was 
recoded to reflect attitude-intention consistency, ranging from 1 (low consistency) to 9 
(high consistency), depending on participants’ initial attitudes. The re-scored items 
formed an index of willingness to engage in attitude-consistent behaviour (α = .86).
Attitude was assessed again with the five semantic differential scales (α = .91) 
and the three attitude certainty items (α = .96) used earlier. Participants also completed 
the three-item measure of self-concept clarity—responses were combined to form a 
measure of post-test uncertainty (α = .78). In addition, participants completed two items 
assessing their comprehension of the normative information provided. They indicated, on 
9-point scales, how similar their opinion was to the opinion of the student group (1 not at  
all similar, 9 extremely similar) and whether the student group supported or opposed 
banning smoking on campus (1 strongly supported, 9 strongly opposed). At the 
conclusion of the study, participants were debriefed.
Results
Manipulation Checks
Uncertainty manipulation checks. To confirm that the dilemmas reported in the 
low and high uncertainty conditions were not qualitatively different, the types of 
dilemmas recorded were examined. As in Study 1, the dilemmas in both conditions were 
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similar in topic and tone, and the dilemmas reported were similar in both studies—that is, 
most participants (79%) deliberated about academic or relationship concerns.
A 2 (uncertainty: low, high) x 3 (type of norm: attitude-incongruent, attitude-
congruent, ambiguous) ANOVA was conducted on participants’ felt uncertainty 
responses. There was a main effect for the uncertainty manipulation only, F(1, 71) = 4.96, 
p = .029, η2 = .07. Participants in the high uncertainty condition reported greater 
uncertainty (M = 2.45) than participants in the low uncertainty condition (M = 2.02). On 
the self-concept clarity measure, analysis revealed a marginal main effect for the 
uncertainty manipulation only, F(1, 71) = 3.72, p = .058, η2 = .05. Participants in the high 
uncertainty condition reported higher levels of uncertainty (M = 2.69) than participants in 
the low uncertainty condition (M = 2.25). It should be noted that, although the effect for 
the uncertainty manipulation is not large, it was successful in inducing changes in both 
immediate felt uncertainty and self-concept certainty. 
On the measure of mood, a 2 x 3 ANOVA did not reveal any significant effects—
thus, the manipulation of uncertainty did not affect mood. As in Study 1, the uncertainty 
manipulation had no effect on self-esteem.
Normative support manipulation checks. On the measure of perceived similarity 
between participants’ attitude and the group norm, a 2 (uncertainty) x 3 (type of norm) 
ANOVA revealed a main effect for normative support only, F(1, 71) = 20.87, p < .001, η2 
= .37. Bonferroni t-tests revealed that participants in the incongruent norm conditions 
perceived lower levels of similarity (M = 4.12) than participants in the congruent or 
ambiguous norm conditions (Ms = 6.89 and 6.22, respectively), t(74) = 5.89, p < .001. 
There was no significant difference between the congruent and ambiguous norm 
conditions, suggesting that participants may have interpreted the ambiguous norm as 
supportive of their own attitude, t(74) = 1.53, ns.  
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On the measure of comprehension of the norm information, a 2 (uncertainty: low, 
high) x 3 (normative information: support ban, oppose ban, ambiguous) analysis revealed 
a significant main effect for type of norm only, F(1, 71) = 32.99, p < .001, η2 = .46. 
Bonferroni tests revealed that participants exposed to the ban-opposing information were 
more likely to report that the group opposed a ban on smoking (M = 7.30) than 
participants exposed to the ban-supporting or ambiguous information (Ms = 3.61 and 
5.21, respectively), t(74) = 7.97, p < .001. In addition, participants exposed to the ban-
supporting information reported that the group norm was more supportive of a ban than 
those in the ambiguous condition, t(74) = 3.40, p < .01.
Dependent Measures7
On the measure of willingness to display attitude-consistent behaviour, analysis 
revealed a main effect for normative support, F(2, 71) = 3.75, p = .028, η2 = .10, such that 
participants exposed to an attitude-incongruent norm displayed less attitude-intention 
consistency (M = 5.38) than participants exposed to either an attitude-congruent (M = 
6.82) or ambiguous norm (M = 5.84), t(74) = 3.08, p = .005. There was no significant 
difference between the attitude-congruent and ambiguous norm conditions, t(74) = 1.35, 
ns. This effect was qualified by a significant Uncertainty x Type of Norm interaction, F(2, 
71) = 5.10, p = .009, η2 = .13. Type of norm had a significant effect on willingness to 
display attitude-consistent behaviour at both low levels of uncertainty, simple F(2, 71) = 
4.41, p = .016, and at high levels of uncertainty, simple F(2, 71) = 4.15, p = .02 (see 
Figure 4).
At low levels of uncertainty, participants displayed higher levels of consistency in 
the congruent norm condition (M = 7.05) compared to the incongruent norm and 
ambiguous norm conditions (Ms = 5.75 and 4.49, respectively), t(36) = 3.19, p = .004. 
However, there was no difference between the incongruent norm and ambiguous norm 
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conditions, t(36) = 1.61, ns. In contrast, at high levels of uncertainty, there was a 
significant difference between the level of consistency displayed in the incongruent norm 
condition (M = 5.00) compared to the congruent norm (M = 6.60) and ambiguous norm 
conditions (Ms = 7.20), t(35) = 2.50, p = .021. However, there was no difference between 
the congruent norm and ambiguous norm conditions, t(35) = .80, ns.  Further analysis 
revealed that the only significant difference between the low and high uncertainty 
participants was in the ambiguous norm condition, F(2, 71) = 9.08, p < .001 (Ms = 4.49 
and 7.20, respectively). 
A 2 (uncertainty) x 3 (type of norm) x 2 (time) within-subjects ANOVA on 
participants’ attitudes revealed no significant main or interactive effects. On the measure 
of change in attitude certainty, analysis revealed a significant Type of Norm x Time 
interaction, F(2, 71) = 3.24, p = .045, η2 = .08. Subsequent analysis revealed a main effect 
for time in the incongruent norm condition only, F(1, 71) = 4.97, p < .04, such that 
participants exposed to an incongruent group norm became less certain of their attitude 
over time (Mchange = .73, t = 2.16, p = .039). Participants in the congruent (Mchange = -.19, t 
= -.65, ns) and ambiguous norm conditions (Mchange = -.42, t = -1.06, ns) did not report 
significant changes in attitude certainty over time.
A 2 (uncertainty) x 3 (type of norm) x 2 (time) within-subjects ANOVA on the 
self-concept clarity scores revealed a significant main effect for time, F(1, 71) = 46.81, p 
< .001, η2 = .40, such that level of self-concept uncertainty decreased over time (Ms = 
2.47 and 2.12, respectively). This effect was qualified by a significant Uncertainty x Time 
interaction, F(1, 71) = 4.22, p = .044, η2 = .06. Tests of the simple main effects revealed 
that self-concept uncertainty decreased over time for both the low, F(1, 71) = 14.46, p < 
.001 (Mchange = .24, t = 4.43, p < .001), and high uncertainty conditions, F(1, 71) = 49.60, 
28
Uncertainty and influence
p < .001 (Mchange = .46, t = 5.70, p < .001), but that this effect was more marked in the high 
uncertainty condition.
Discussion
The type of norm influenced how willing participants were to engage in attitude-
consistent behaviour. Participants exposed to an ingroup norm that was incongruent with 
their attitudes reported lower levels of attitude-intention consistency than participants 
exposed to either a supportive or an ambiguous norm. 
However, of key importance to the current research, uncertainty interacted with 
type of norm to influence displays of attitude-related behaviour. More specifically, type of 
norm influenced conformity for both the certain and uncertain participants. When 
participants were relatively certain, a supportive group norm increased attitude-intention 
consistency relative to a non-supportive or ambiguous norm. However, for uncertain 
participants, either a supportive or an ambiguous norm increased attitude-related 
consistency (relative to a non-supportive norm).  Moreover, although participants did not 
report significant attitude change, the degree of certainty with which those attitudes were 
held did vary as a function of the type of norm provided. Exposure to a non-supportive 
norm was associated with a significant decrease in attitude certainty and confidence. In 
contrast, exposure to either a supportive or ambiguous group norm was not associated 
with a change in attitude certainty.  Finally, self-concept uncertainty decreased 
significantly for all participants. However, this effect was more marked in the high 
uncertainty condition, highlighting the difficulty of maintaining uncertainty due to 
people’s motivation to reduce uncertainty.
It is important to note, however, that the effect for type of norm for participants 
low in uncertainty seems somewhat inconsistent with the results of Study 1. In Study 1, 
where participants were exposed to either a supportive or a non-supportive group norm, 
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type of norm had no significant effect on attitude-intention consistency in the low 
uncertainty condition. In Study 2, low uncertainty participants displayed greater 
consistency when exposed to a supportive norm than either a non-supportive or an 
ambiguous norm. How can one resolve this apparent discrepancy across the studies? In 
order to examine this further, we conducted additional analyses where we focused 
specifically on the effects of either a supportive or non-supportive group norm for low 
and high uncertainty participants. Variability associated with the ambiguous norm 
condition (the condition absent from Study 1) was removed and the simple main effects 
were tested against a new, in fact larger, error term. These analyses revealed that, as in 
Study 1, low uncertainty participants displayed equivalent levels of attitude-intention 
consistency across the supportive and non-supportive norm conditions (F[1, 53] = 2.80, 
ns). In contrast, high uncertainty participants displayed greater attitude-intention 
consistency when exposed to a supportive norm than when exposed to a non-supportive 
group norm (F[1, 53] = 3.93, p = .053). 
We feel it is of particular interest that the primary difference between low and 
high uncertainty participants’ group-mediated conformity was in the ambiguous norm 
condition. When people were relatively certain, they treated an ambiguous norm like a 
non-supportive norm, displaying low levels of attitude-intention consistency - suggesting 
that people who feel certain do not like an ambiguous norm, perhaps because it makes 
uncertainties (i.e., in the group’s position on an issue) salient. 
When people were uncertain, they treated the ambiguous norm like a congruent 
norm, displaying equivalent levels of consistency in these conditions. It might be the case 
that uncertain participants are engaging in a form of biased processing in relation to the 
ambiguous norm. That is, because an ambiguous norm does not contradict their attitude 
position directly, uncertain individuals may interpret an ambiguous norm as consistent 
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with their opinion, thereby helping to crystallise their attitudes and reduce uncertainty. 
Opinion conviction is one response to personal uncertainty (see McGregor, 2004, for a 
review), but such convictions will be undermined by the awareness that others do not 
share the same convictions. An ambiguous norm may allow uncertain individuals to 
engage in conviction as an uncertainty reduction strategy without eliciting concerns 
related to the extent to which others agree with one’s opinions. Clearly, this account is 
speculative and needs to be tested explicitly in future research.  
It should be noted that the results relating to the ambiguous norm condition are 
not what we would have expected based on recent work suggesting that uncertain 
individuals might like groups with clear and consensual prototypes (i.e., highly entitative 
groups—see Hogg et al., in press). However, clear and consensual prototypes and norms 
are but one of the properties of entitative groups. It is possible that if our ambiguous norm 
had been framed against the background of a low entitativity group, individuals high in 
uncertainty would not have responded favourably to the ambiguous norm. Clearly, future 
research is needed in which the role of uncertainty and entitativity are examined in 
relation to social influence processes.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Uncertainty has long been implicated by social psychologists in social influence 
processes (e.g., Asch, 1956; Deutsch & Gerard, 1955; Sherif, 1936). Typically uncertainty 
has been conceptualized as perceptual or judgemental uncertainty tied to ambiguous 
stimuli, or, in the case of more recent self-categorization analyses uncertainly caused by 
perceptual or judgemental disagreement with fellow ingroup members (e.g, Turner et al., 
1987).
In this article we draw on uncertainty reduction theory (e.g., Hogg, 2000) to 
attribute a more fundamental role to uncertainty in social influence. Feelings of 
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uncertainty much more generally, but in particular uncertainty about or related to self-
conception, provide a powerful base for conformity to self-defining (ingroup) norms. To 
investigate this idea we conducted two experiments adopting an attitude-behaviour 
paradigm devised and used by Terry and her colleagues (e.g., Smith & Terry, 2003). We 
set out to show that the tendency for people to behave more in accordance with their 
attitudes when their attitudes are supported by their ingroup norm (see Terry, Hogg, & 
White, 2000) would be strengthened when people felt generally uncertain about 
themselves. The results of the current research highlighted that group-mediated attitude-
behaviour consistency may by underpinned, at least in part, by uncertainty phenomena—
that is, uncertainty about oneself, one’s social world, and one’s relationships with other 
people may drive conformity to ingroup norms in the attitude-behaviour context. 
In both studies, uncertainty was manipulated by asking participants to think about 
an unresolved dilemma in their own life (high uncertainty) or in the life of a friend (low 
uncertainty). Thus, the uncertainty was related to the self and the social world rather than 
related to the specific experimental setting or to a judgemental task. Next, participants 
were exposed to information regarding the ingroup norm: in Study 1, the ingroup norm 
was either supportive or non-supportive of participants’ attitudes; in Study 2, we included 
a third condition in which the group norm was ambiguous. Level of conformity to the 
ingroup norm was the critical outcome measure; however, measures of willingness to 
work for the group (Study 1), change in self-concept uncertainty, and change in attitude 
certainty (Study 2) were also assessed. 
Taken together, there was consistent evidence that ingroup norms influence 
willingness to engage in attitude-consistent behaviour—participants reported stronger 
attitude-consistent intentions when exposed to a supportive group norm than when 
exposed to a non-supportive group norm or an ambiguous group norm. However, as 
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predicted, level of conformity to ingroup norms varied as a function of level of self-
relevant uncertainty. In Study 1, only high uncertainty participants responded to ingroup 
norm, displaying more willingness to engage in attitude-consistent behaviour and more 
willingness to work for the group when exposed to a supportive group norm. In Study 2, 
both low and high uncertainty participants responded to the type of ingroup norm 
presented. Low uncertainty participants responded to the non-supportive and ambiguous 
norms in a similar fashion, reducing their willingness to engage in attitude-consistent 
behaviour. In contrast, high uncertainty participants responded to the supportive and 
ambiguous norms in a similar way, displaying higher levels of attitude-consistent 
intentions compared to a non-supportive norm. Thus, the tendency for people to behave 
more in accordance with their attitudes when their attitudes are supported by their ingroup 
norm was strengthened when people felt generally uncertain about themselves.
Additional findings emerged on the measures of change in self-relevant 
uncertainty and change in attitude certainty. Overall, level of self-relevant uncertainty 
decreased for all participants in both studies. This was particularly true for the high 
uncertainty participants who, over time, reported a level of uncertainty comparable with 
the low uncertainty participants. Indeed, one of the key features of uncertainty is that it is 
aversive, such that people are motivated to reduce or resolve uncertainties. Our results 
suggest that uncertainty, as manipulated here, has a short “half-life” and is difficult to 
maintain over time. Alternatively, what these results might indicate is the successful 
reduction of uncertainty through conformity to the ingroup norm. Assessment of change 
in attitude certainty was incorporated into Study 2. Attitude certainty decreased only when 
participants were exposed to a non-supportive ingroup norm, but this did not vary as a 
function of self-relevant uncertainty. Exposure to a supportive group norm or an 
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ambiguous group norm did not influence participants’ certainty or confidence in their own 
attitude position.   
It is important to consider that there were multiple sources of uncertainty in our 
study: self-relevant uncertainty and the uncertainty created by disagreement with similar 
others (i.e., the incongruent norm). Indeed, results indicated that participants became 
more uncertain about their attitudes following the provision of an attitude-incongruent 
group norm. Thus, one might ask which source of uncertainty is central to these efects. 
Additional analyses in which change in attitude certainty was entered as a covariate 
enabled some light to be shed on this issue—even after controlling for changes in attitude 
certainty, level of conformity continued to vary as a function of self-relevant uncertainty 
and level of normative support. Thus, although disagreement with fellow group members 
certainly plays a role in social influence phenomena (see Abrams et al., 1990), it is 
important to acknowledge the role that self-relevant uncertainty plays in conformity to 
group norms.
In the current research, there was consistent evidence that uncertainty influences 
conformity to group norms and group behaviour. However, a key contribution of the 
current research is the demonstration that uncertainty need not be linked directly to the 
task at hand to play a role in conformity to group norms. More generalised self-relevant 
uncertainty determines conformity to specific group norms in the context of the attitude-
behaviour relationship. The uncertainties felt by the participants in the current study were 
disparate, ranging from academic uncertainty to relationship uncertainty to uncertainty 
about life decisions, yet the result was the same: increased conformity to ingroup norms, 
even if conformity to group norms involved responses that were inconsistent with 
participants’ expressed attitudes. Thus, the present research goes further in demonstrating 
the impact of uncertainty on social influence processes. That is, when uncertain, 
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individuals do not only bring their behaviour into line with a group on trivial matters such 
as perceptual judgements, but are willing to behave in an attitude-inconsistent fashion if 
the norms of the group prescribe this. Thus, cleaving to dominant, positive, societal norms 
appears to provide a sense of purpose and direction and knowing that others share a set of 
norms helps to bolster these norms and the attitudes and beliefs associated with them.
In our research, we manipulated self-relevant uncertainty directly using a 
paradigm developed and tested by McGregor and colleagues (McGregor & Marigold, 
2003; McGregor et al., 2001). There are, however, other established techniques to 
manipulate the salience of uncertainty. For example, van den Bos and colleagues (van den 
Bos, 2001; van den Bos et al., 2005) have manipulated uncertainty successfully by asking 
participants to focus on the emotions and physical sensations associated with being 
uncertain. In contrast, the manipulation used in our research primes individuals to focus 
on the inconsistencies among self-relevant cognitions, goals, values, and possible selves. 
Similarly, Hogg et al. (in press) ask participants to note three things about themselves, 
their lives, and their future that either make them feel certain or uncertain. Thus, 
researchers in this field are able to select from an increasingly diverse range of 
manipulations.  
In sum, the present results are promising with respect to the role of self-relevant or 
subjective uncertainty in determining level of conformity to group norms and displays of 
group behaviour. Clearly the next step in this line of research is to investigate the 
potential mediating role of group identification. According to Hogg’s (2000) uncertainty 
reduction theory, uncertainty motivates identification with social groups which, in turn, 
should motivate group behaviour (e.g., conformity, collective action, ingroup bias). To 
date, there is good evidence that uncertainty motivates identification with social groups 
(e.g., Hogg et al., in press; Reid & Hogg, 2005) and that uncertainty motivates group 
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behaviour, namely ingroup bias (e.g., Grieve & Hogg, 1999). In addition, research on the 
social identity approach to attitude-behaviour relations has indicated that identification 
plays an important role in determining conformity to group norms (e.g., Terry & Hogg, 
1996). Future research should integrate these literatures more fully through an 
examination of the role of identification in uncertainty-related group-mediated attitude-
behaviour consistency.
Uncertainty, and the resolution of uncertainty, is a driving force behind many 
social phenomena such as ingroup bias (e.g., Grieve & Hogg, 1999), responses to fairness 
procedures (e.g., van den Bos, 2001), and conformity to group norms (e.g., Abrams et al., 
1993). The present study represents a first step in examining the role of self-relevant 
uncertainty in conformity to group norms against the background of established attitudes 
and beliefs, thereby extending the scope of research on uncertainty and its correlates. 
Further research that investigates the impact of uncertainty on group-mediated behaviour 
with a range of target behaviours and group memberships is needed to uncover the vast 
array of strategies available to individuals in their search for uncertainty reduction. 
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Footnotes
1. In most Australian universities, student union membership, via the payment of union 
dues, is compulsory for all students. In return, the student union funds a number of 
services for students (e.g., childcare, legal services) and engages in political action to 
protect the rights of students. The introduction of voluntary student unionism, a 
position advocated by the current conservative government, would mean that students 
would have the right to choose whether they wish to join a student association and 
pay union fees. However, many believe that this would result in poorer services to 
students and would stifle political action.
2. The uncertainty manipulation used here has been used extensively in past research 
(see McGregor, 2003, 2004, for reviews). It can be argued, however, that the low 
uncertainty and high uncertainty conditions do not differ only in terms of the self-
relevance of the uncertainty (i.e., self vs. friend), but also in terms of whether the 
uncertainty is resolved (i.e., the self dilemma is unsolved but the friend dilemma has a 
solution). Research by McGregor and Marigold (2003) sheds light on this issue. In 
their first study, these authors employed multiple control conditions (friend’s dilemma 
vs. easy personal decisions vs. free association) and found that the effects of the high 
uncertainty condition were not due solely to the nature of the control condition. Thus, 
effects in the high uncertainty conditions are not due solely to the difference in the 
extent to which the dilemmas have been resolved.
3. A principal components factor analysis with varimax rotation on the self-concept 
clarity, self-esteem, and mood items revealed a three-factor solution, which accounted 
for 63% of the variance. The three mood items defined the first factor (eigenvalue = 
4.59, 38% of the variance, all factor loadings exceeded .80), while the five self-
concept clarity items defined the second factor (eigenvalue = 1.59, 13% of the 
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variance, all factor loadings exceeded .53). The final factor reflected the self-esteem 
items (eigenvalue = 1.48, 12% of the variance, all factor loadings exceeded .61). 
Thus, self-concept clarity, self-esteem, and mood reflect three distinct factors.
4. Studies of the attitude-behaviour relationship typically assess the relationship between 
attitudes and behaviour by means of a correlation. However, in experimental studies, 
this method is not appropriate because the sample sizes in each cell are not large 
enough to provide sufficient power to test for differences in the strength of the 
attitude-behaviour relationship across experimental conditions. Recoding behavioural 
responses in the way used in the present study allows participants’ original attitude 
position to be reflected in the outcome measures.  This recoding method has been 
used in past experimental research in the attitude-behaviour context (see Smith & 
Terry, 2003; Terry, Hogg, & McKimmie, 2000; Wellen et al., 1998).
5. We controlled for mood (and gender) in a series of preliminary analyses of 
covariance. Mood was not a significant covariate in these analyses and the inclusion 
of mood as a covariate did not alter the results.
6. A principal components factor analysis with varimax rotation on the self-concept 
clarity, felt uncertainty, self-esteem, and mood items revealed a four-factor solution, 
which accounted for 71% of the variance. The three mood items defined the first 
factor (eigenvalue = 2.99, 20% of the variance, all factor loadings exceeded .84), 
while the five felt uncertainty items defined the second factor (eigenvalue = 2.69, 
18% of the variance, all factor loadings exceeded .42). The third factor was defined by 
the self-concept clarity items (eigenvalue = 2.61, 17% of the variance, all factor 
loadings exceeded .84). The final factor reflected the self-esteem items (eigenvalue = 
2.44, 16% of the variance, all factor loadings exceeded .50). Thus, self-concept 
clarity, felt uncertainty, self-esteem, and mood reflect four distinct factors.
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7. We controlled for gender and initial attitude in a series of preliminary analyses of 
covariance. The inclusion of these covariates did not alter the pattern of results; the 
results from the ANOVAs are presented.
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Figure 1. Interaction between uncertainty and normative support on willingness to display 
attitude-consistent behaviour (Study 1).
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Figure 2. Interaction between uncertainty and normative support on willingness to work 
for the group (Study 1).
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Figure 3. Interaction between uncertainty and normative support on change in uncertainty 
(positive scores reflect an increase in certainty; Study 1).
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Figure 4. Interaction between uncertainty and normative support on willingness to display 
attitude-consistent behaviour (Study 2).
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